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 1
A 1957 Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) pamphlet entitled “Rural 
Family Defense” opened by stressing to farmers the importance of their responsibility to 
the country during the Cold War. “If YOUR farm and family are NOT endangered by 
enemy attack, you must keep on producing food, fibre, dairy products, and other output 
essential to winning the war. The Nation’s survival then will depend on how well you 
prepare now.”1 This focus on ensuring that American farmers kept an ample supply of 
food and agricultural products on hand was a common theme for civil defense agencies 
such as the FCDA and other governmental agencies, like the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), and Federal Extension Service (FES) throughout the Cold War. 
Besides encouraging rural Americans to keep the nation’s food supply well stocked, rural 
civil defense policies encouraged rural Americans to be willing to host potential urban 
evacuees as well as to build and stock their a fallout shelter for their family and their 
livestock.  
Over the past thirty years, many historians have researched and written about 
Cold War civil defense. While historians like Laura McEnaney, Paul Boyer, Guy Oakes, 
and Tracy C. Davis, have all looked at impact that civil defense had on Americans during 
the Cold War, these historians have only looked at the ways that these policies affected 
the majority of Americans who lived in urban, industrial, or suburban settings. Historians 
such as Boyer and Davis have researched on the psychological affects that civil defense 
measures had on American society during the Cold War. Others, like McEnaney and 
Oakes, have argued that family fallout shelters increasingly militarized the American 
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family during the era, by promoting a military like structure to family shelters and 
preparedness plans. 2  
Yet, while many historians have researched the affects that civil defense had on 
Americans during the Cold War, little historical inquiry has been spent on the impact that 
these polices had on rural families. Only one historian, Jenny Barker Devine, has looked 
at the impact of Cold War civil defense measures on farm and rural families. While 
Devine’s study is the first of its kind, more research is needed on rural civil defense. 
Devine’s study provides an important overview of rural civil defense and views about the 
new advances in nuclear technology. However, there has been no further research on the 
ways that these policies were interpreted by federal, state, and county governments or the 
ways that individual farm families viewed the policies of evacuation and fallout shelters.  
With little secondary material on rural civil and defense, and none that approach 
the subject on a regional or community level, many of the sources that have been 
incorporated in this paper come from previously untapped sources. These sources include 
the Rural Civil Defense records from the Extension Service Records held at the Oregon 
State University Archives and newspaper articles from a regional agricultural newspaper 
in the Northwest, the Capital Press. Both of these sources have provided many valuable 
views towards rural civil defense and the ways that rural Northwesterners interpreted 
these policies.  
The tension between the United States and Soviet Union that created and 
maintained the Cold War ran from near the end of the 1940s through the start of the 
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1990s. While the Cold War lasted forty years, the scope of this paper will cover from 
1950 to 1970, during the height of the civil defense rhetoric in the United States. After 
the late 1960s and 1970s, the rhetoric behind civil defense measures started to decrease 
with low popular and political support. During these twenty years, however, national and 
international events such as the successful test of the Soviet Union’s Atomic Bomb and 
both countries development of a more deadly and horrific Hydrogen Bomb, kept the idea 
of civil defense in the minds of American civilians and government officials who moved 
the policies onto the public. International political events, like the Bay of Pigs and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, also added to the sense of fear of an Atomic attack as many 
Americans viewed the possibility of an Atomic or Hydrogen Bomb attack from the 
Soviets as a real possibility. 
 Circumstances within different regions in the United States also generated to the 
use of civil defense measures. Military bases, nuclear testing sites, and large cities all 
made a region vulnerable to an attack. In the Midwest, large military bases like Offutt Air 
Force Base and the Strategic Air Command (SAC), both located in Nebraska, added to 
the list of the region’s likely targets. In the West, nuclear testing sites like Hanford 
Engineering Works in Southeastern Washington added to the threat that Westerns felt 
from the possibility of a nuclear attack. With variations between different regions in the 
nation, civil defense measures in the United States lay in a hierarchical structure. The 
federal government created the nation’s main civil defense policies, while state and 
county governments attempted to follow national guidelines and polices.  
At the national level, federal agencies like the FCDA, the USDA, and the FES, 
provided the rhetoric that state and county governments were to incorporate in their state 
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and community. At the state level, regional differences added to the ways that states 
responded to the national policies. 3 In the West, the presence of nuclear testing sites like 
Hanford, added to the level of response that Western states gave towards civil defense. 
Likewise, the presence of military bases like Offutt Air Force Base and SAC in the 
Midwest also affected the level of response that Midwestern states gave towards civil 
defense. Finally, at the county and individual level, civil defense polices were 
incorporated with varying levels of support. Between 1950 and 1970, rural Americans in 
the Midwest and Northwest, had to cope with a financial, logistical, and moral burden 
that resulted from civil defense policies that favored urban and industrial Americans.  
 
Federal Views Towards Rural Americans and Civil Defense 
 
While the majority of Americans did not live in rural areas during the second half 
of the twentieth century, federal, state, and county governments promoted rural 
Americans to be more involved in civil defense measures that the United States enacted 
during the Cold War then non-rural Americans.4 After the Soviet Union successfully 
tested an Atomic Bomb in August 1949, the United States was no longer the only nation 
with the capability to wreak massive havoc with a single bomb. Civil defense measures 
enacted during the Cold War attempted to directly quell the fears that arose from a 
theoretical Soviet attack. Evacuation routes designed to move Americans out of urban 
and other high-risk areas out to rural and low-risk regions became one of the primary 
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civil defense measures during the early Cold War. These plans often made rural regions 
the endpoints for the urban evacuees. According to Rural Family Defense, rural 
Americans were to be in “charge of reception centers for evacuees, have positions of 
responsibility and authority regarding feeding, shelter, sanitation facilities, first aid, 
welfare, billeting in homes and in farm facilities.” However, the pamphlet gave little 
information to farm families on the ways that they were suppose to pay for these centers 
and the good required to stock them or the amount of compensation that the federal 
government would pass on to these families after the crisis was over. The pamphlet also 
ignored the logistical burden that rural Americans received of finding all of the supplies 
that they would need or the space to house urban evacuees.5  
Like evacuation plans that often assumed rural Americans would be ready and 
willing to provide for the vast number of urban evacuees, the government’s policy toward 
fallout shelters also placed an unfair burden on rural Americans. In urban and industrial 
regions, public fallout shelters provided an effective way for the government to provide a 
sense of security and protection in the event of an attack. In rural areas, however, these 
public shelters were ineffective with a small and spread out population. In these regions, 
the government promoted private shelters to keep farm families and other rural 
Americans, livestock, and crops protected from nuclear fallout. These private shelters 
moved the expense of building and stocking the shelter from the government to rural 
Americans. Private shelters also placed an ethical burden on rural Americans who have 
traditionally been viewed as the ‘moral backbone’ of the nation by promoting virtue, a 
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hard work ethic, and traditional family values.6 Besides being responsible for their 
family’s safety during a hypothetical attack, farm families were also responsible for 
ensuring the safety of their livestock and crops from nuclear fallout.   
 
Nuclear Threat in the Northwest: Hanford Nuclear Reservation 
 
Despite a lower population in the Northwest and Midwest, these regions were still 
vulnerable to nuclear attack. Military bases in the Midwest like Offutt Air Force Base and 
the SAC in Nebraska and nuclear testing sites across the Western United States added to 
the possibility of attack in these regions. While rural regions included small and spread 
out populations, the vast spread of fallout that would have occurred after an attack also 
added to the threat that farmers had from an Atomic attack. According to Bruce Hevly 
and John M. Findlay, the American West seemed like the perfect place for the 
establishment of nuclear testing sites such as Hanford in Southeastern Washington. Hevly 
and Findlay argue it was fitting that workers in the American West helped develop and 
test nuclear technology during the Cold War, since both the West and nuclear power have 
“generally been a realm of dramatic hopes and fears, a place often likened to hell or to 
heaven.”7  
The federal government also saw the possibility that the West generated by 
viewing the region as ‘relatively empty, and they valued that undeveloped space for its 
apparent capacity to buffer people from the dangers associated with making and testing 
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nuclear weapons and storing hazardous wastes,” according to Hevly and Findlay.8 An 
optimistic view of opportunity in the American West has also been extended toward its 
inhabitants. Images of the hardworking, rugged, and virtuous pioneer have often been 
bestowed upon Westerners. In the 1957 thirty-minute CBS documentary on Portland 
Oregon’s evacuation plans, entitled “The Day Called ‘X,’” actor Glenn Ford introduces 
Oregonians as being “friendly, and rugged in the tradition of the Oregon Trail.”9 
However, these ‘friendly and rugged” Westerns also had to deal with large nuclear testing 
sites that interrupted these rural and ‘empty’ landscapes.  
Peter Goin has called these regions where nuclear testing sites moved on to rural 
landscapes “nuclear landscapes” that are “landscapes of fear.” One of these ‘nuclear 
landscapes’ is the 570 square mile Hanford Engineering Works - later renamed the 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation- in Southeastern Washington. However, before the federal 
government could begin construction at the Hanford site in 1943, the roughly 1,200 
people who lived in the small farming communities of Hanford and White Bluffs needed 
to relocate away from the site. 10 Michael D’Antonio notes that while the region was too 
dry and arid to grow many crops, the Hanford and White Bluffs farmers had orchards, 
planted winter wheat and let cattle graze on nearby ranges.11  
According to Michele Stenehjem Gerber, the news of the site’s selection came as 
a surprise to local residents. During a mass meeting held in Richmond, local residents 
were quick to ask the representatives of the Army Corps of Engineers why the 
                                                        
8
 Hevly and Findlay, 4. 
9
 The Day Called 'X' Directed by Harry Rasky. Produced by Harry Rasky. Performed by Glenn Ford and The 
People of The City of Portland. Columbia Broadcasting Services, 1957. archive.org/details/DayCalle1955_2 ; 
http://archive.org/details/DayCalle1955_2. 
10
 Peter Goin, Nuclear Landscapes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), xix, 3-4. 
11
 Michael D'Antonio, Atomic Harvest: Hanford and The Lethal Toll of America's Nuclear Arsenal (New 
York: Crown Publishers, 1993), 12. 
 8
government wanted the land that was too arid and difficult to use. However, the Corps of 
Engineers were reluctant to let slip the purpose behind the site’s selection. Colonel 
Franklin T. Matthias told the local farmers who were being moved off their land that “If I 
told you what the government is doing, I’d be court-martialed tomorrow.”12 Within 
months, the region drastically changed from rural farming communities to boasting a 
population of nearly 51,000 people as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the 
construction site. The region continued to grow as construction workers boosted the 
population to over 95,000.13 
This rapid change in the nature of local communities directly affected the 
surrounding towns around Hanford that ballooned after the site was established. As a 
result from the influx of scientists and others who were involved with the nuclear site, the 
surrounding Tri-Cities of Richmond, Pasco, and Kennewick quickly grew. By the end of 
WWII, a federal edict restricted people who were not operating personnel at Hanford 
from residing in the town; the town quickly grew to boast a population of 13,000. By 
1949, another 10,000 moved into Richland. While the federal government restricted who 
could live in Richland, the surround towns of Pasco and Kennewick also underwent a 
population boom, by 1949, 65,000 people called the region home. In less than ten years, 
one of the government’s main reasons for choosing the rural and isolated region for an 
Atomic testing site became moot. The ‘isolated’ region grew from a small population of 
around 1200 persons to a sizeable population of over 65,000.14 
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The rapid change that occurred in Southeast Washington after Hanford was 
established also had an effect on local farm families in the region. Besides displacing the 
rural families who had previously lived around the Hanford site, the site’s presence and 
the expansion of the Tri-Cities further stressed the local food supply. The former towns 
of Hanford and White Bluffs had been well known for their fruit orchards. However, 
because of the possible radioactive hazards that the Hanford site caused, farm families 
abandoned the orchards, and later cut the trees down, leaving fields of stumps behind.15  
 
Rural Civil Defense and Evacuation Plans: 
National Evacuation Plans  
 
 While only a few Americans lived in rural areas during the second half of the 
twentieth century, the production of agricultural goods and protection of farm families 
and other rural Americans from nuclear fallout were still carefully considered by the 
federal agencies that established the nation’s main civil defense measures during the Cold 
War. However, according to Devine, rural Americans were typically viewed as a 
“homogenous group” who were willing and able to take an active role in civil defense 
and “rarely in need of direct assistance from the federal government.”16 With this view in 
mind, rural regions were often the end points for evacuation routes from urban and other 
high-risk centers. A 1956 FCDA pamphlet, Home Protection Exercises, highlighted a 
view towards civil defense that was typical for the federal government during the 1950s. 
The pamphlet stated, “With the development of more powerful nuclear weapons, 
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evacuation is the best defense against enemy attack. Evacuation depends upon having 
sufficient warning time; however, we cannot be sure that we will have sufficient warning 
time in all cases. Therefore, the family will need shelter. The better the shelter, the better 
the chance for survival.”17  
The director of the FCDA, Val Peterson, also promoted a focus on evacuation 
plans. In an article in the September 1954 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Peterson argued, “On the whole, it is foolish to talk any more about remaining in the city 
to duck and take cover.” Yet, not all Americans agreed with Peterson’s position. The 
article noted that while the Bulletin agreed with Peterson, he had not yet sold all local 
communities on evacuation plans. The Bulletin noted that Peterson “had to get across his 
ideas to the local communities many of which looked upon evacuation as utterly silly.” 18  
 Director Peterson was a former governor of Nebraska, a state heavily dependent 
upon agriculture and farm families. Yet, Peterson and the federal government took a 
similar stance on the relationship between rural Americans and evacuation plans. In an 
interview with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in December of 1954 Peterson 
responded to a question that dealt with the legal responsibility that rural Americans had 
towards potential urban evacuees in the event that evacuation was required. Peterson told 
the interviewer that:  
 
You have a higher responsibility to your fellow man than that which is written in 
the law. And I should also not be inclined to want to dispute my responsibility 
with the evacuees as they came into my front yard. But for those souls who do 
want to insist upon being legal about this, should an attack come upon this 
country, there would be legal authority that could be employed to require us to 
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perform what is actually our moral duty, if necessary. I trust that kind of action 
should never be necessary.19 
 
 Director Peterson was not the only source that told rural Americans they would be 
responsible for the care and protection of urban evacuees in the event that evacuation 
plans were set in motion. Rural Family Defense also played on the “moral duty” of rural 
Americans that Peterson stressed. In the 1957 pamphlet, farm and rural families were told 
that “Every rural family and community should be prepared to help care for evacuees 
from attacked areas. There is no way to determine in advance what rural areas will be 
safe to receive and care for these evacuated persons.” Rural Family Defense appealed to 
the assumed moral values of rural Americans in a second section, but also appealed to 
rural Americans self interest. “Rural families may be asked to help the people in attacked 
areas. Your own safety, the protection of your property, and the future of your income 
depend directly on a quick restoration of the economy between rural areas and cities.” 20 
 Throughout the early and mid 1950s, Peterson and the FCDA held annual 
evacuation drills throughout the nation. Shortly after Peterson announced the evacuation 
plan as a means of national civil defense, several cities across the United States took part 
in evacuation drills as a part of “Operation Alert.” The purpose of “Operation Alert” was 
to show the feasibility of evacuation. While the national policy of evacuation went into 
effect, many states started to form their own evacuation plans. Peterson’s home state of 
Nebraska “published a three-volume contingency plan entitled the State of Nebraska 
Operational Survival Plan.” This contingency plan provided information on the 
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evacuation routes for the 640,000 people who lived in the major cities in the state and the 
Offutt Air Force Base and the SAC.21  
 
Evacuation Plans: “Utterly Silly” 
 
However, support for evacuation was not universal. Besides the local 
communities that considered Peterson’s evacuation plans as “utterly silly”, urban 
residents were also cautious of evacuation plans. City planners and highway 
commissioners were concerned if the road system would be able to handle a mass 
evacuation from an urban center.22 McEnaney argues that major labor unions such as the 
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations were 
concerned with the effect that mass mobilization out of the cities would have on urban 
workers and their families. The unions’ response was that either the state or federal 
government provide for the workers “social and economic needs” in the event of 
dispersal to suburban or rural areas during evacuation.23 
 While rural Americans were fearful that their communities might quickly become 
refugee camps for urban Americans, complications of race and segregation also affected 
views towards evacuation from both rural and urban Americans. In 1954, Mobile 
Alabama held a mock evacuation drill. Dubbed “Operation Scat” by the FCDA, Scat 
tested the level of participation by the city’s black population in the drill. The FCDA 
hired ethnographers from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to monitor the drill. 
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The report from the NAS noted that the low participation levels of Mobile’s black 
citizens was most likely due to local and economic conditions rather then a desire by the 
African American community to ignore the drill. The NAS reported that many African 
Americans did not own radios or televisions and that a higher rate of illiteracy among the 
city’s black population limited the effectiveness of the announcement of Scat by local 
print media.  
With little prior warning of the drill, the NAS reported on a rumor that Operation 
Scat was not a test in the city, but that Scat’s purpose was to bomb the city and to kill of 
“most of the Negroes so that they wouldn’t have to go through with school de-
segregation.” During the drill, the NAS report also noted, few African Americans owned 
their own vehicles and were underserved by public transport, which represented a 
problem when evacuation plans called for the mass use of public transportation and 
private cars.24 When asked by a NAS observer if whites would pick up African 
Americans during a real evacuation, a white police officer responded by first supporting 
segregation and then claimed that he would pick up a black man if he was not going to be 
picked up by anyone else. However, according to historian Tracy C. Davis, the 
“researcher got a clear impression from this that whites would always be given 
priority.”25 While the NAS reported that participation levels were low across Mobile’s 
black neighborhoods, McEnaney argues that African American’s low level of response 
could have been protesting “white police, racist local civil defense programs, or the 
travesty of self-help without the means to carry it out,” and not civil defense in general.26  
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Race relations during evacuation were again considered by the FCDA and other 
civil defense agencies even though, according to McEnaney, the “FCDA annual meetings 
and literature avoided direct conversation about the racial aspects of evacuation.”27 A 
study done by John Hopkins examined evacuation routes from Washington D.C. into 
rural Virginia and Maryland. The study predicted that “social problems” would be likely 
to emerge “when predominantly Negro populations [are] evacuated to predominantly 
white areas.”28 Even though the FCDA attempted to limit any frank discussion about race 
and evacuation, the topic sometimes seeped into to the discussion. At the 1954 women’s 
conference held by the FCDA, Marjorie Husted, better known as Betty Crocker, 
promoted the sense of “community” to housewives while also advising them to prepare 
for “racial… invasions” if they lived in evacuation reception centers.29  
Scientists and scholars unconnected with the FCDA and civil defense also looked 
at the possible racial tensions that could arise during evacuation. Francis R. Allen, a 
sociologist at Florida State University during the 1950s, noticed that race relations could 
be a potential problem for evacuation and that more research needed to be done on the 
issue. Allen questioned “what special problems relevant for civil defense are involved in 
dealing with Negroes in the South, immigrant populations in the Northeast, Middle West, 
or other cities, Pacific Coast residents, and the like? In short, what racial, nationality, and 
local-culture items not previously mentioned may be identified which would affect civil 
defense activities or problems?”30 However, while Allen suggested that further research 
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was needed on any potential race issues, the topic was left mostly untouched by several 
state civil defense agencies including in Oregon.  
In the Northwest, questions over race relations were more likely to be between 
whites and migrant immigrant laborers than between whites and African Americans. 
Potential race issues were mostly ignored. The Oregon State University Rural Civil 
Defense program, sponsored by the Oregon State Cooperative Extension Service, wrote 
extensive biannual progress reports to the USDA on their activity in the state. Only one 
report from the six years that the program was active hints at race relations. The  “Rural 
Civil Defense Progress Report January 1 – June 30, 1966” noted that, "One meeting was 
held in Jackson County Court where migrant housing design was discussed with the 
County Court, Associated Fruit Growers, and the country extension agent. The RCD 
engineer suggested possible designs of houses that would provide maximum fallout 
protection.”31 Yet the report did not mention if the discussion about increasing fallout 
protection in housing for the mostly Latino migrant workers between the Jackson County 
Court, Fruit Growers and country extension agent went any further then a basic 
discussion that was quickly forgotten as the meeting progressed. However, the Rural 
Civil Defense program in Oregon was established near the end of 1962, well after most 
evacuation plans had been exchanged for public and private fallout shelters as the 
nation’s primary means of civil defense. Any issues that could have arisen between 
migrant workers and white farmers may have been more pronounced if the Rural Civil 
Defense program existed during the 1950s when evacuation plans were in their prime 
across the nation.  
                                                        
31
“Rural Civil Defense Progress Report January 1 – June 30, 1966”, Extension Service Records, Special 
Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries, Box 73 “Rural Civil Defense Reports, 
Records, and Memorandas 1963-1976.” 
 16
Regional Evacuation Plans 
 
While the FCDA and USDA laid out the groundwork for rural civil defense, civil 
defense measures were also dependent upon the level of response that various states gave 
to civil defense. According to Allen, “it is apparent that the characteristics which make 
one area attractive as a target for military attack and another area unattractive vary over a 
nation, hence the nuclear threat is not the same in all parts of the United States.” Allen 
continued to argue that different regional factors such as large population centers, 
military bases and other factors all contributed to a region’s threat level.32  
According to Allen, the number of people who lived in “critical target areas” of 
areas with “40,000 or more industrial employees” in the Midwest and Northwest were 
much lower then in the Northeast and Great Lakes region. While over 44 percent of the 
nation’s total population lived in critical target areas in the Northeast in 1953, only two 
and half percent of the nation’s population lived in a critical target area in Kansas, 
Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming combined. The West Coast states of Washington, 
Oregon, California and Nevada included over 12.5 percent of the nation’s population who 
lived in a target area. 33  
 
Evacuation Plans in Nebraska and Oregon 
 
The state of Nebraska developed a comprehensive three-volume plan for 
evacuation during Val Peterson’s tenure as director of the FCDA. While Peterson was an 
                                                        
32
 Allen, 239- 241. 
33
 Allen, 241. 
 17
active proponent for evacuation, the resulting Nebraska Plan was slightly less 
enthusiastic. The Nebraska Plan acknowledged, “no effective shelter now exists in the 
target areas, and evacuation to safer areas is the only alternative remaining.” The 
evacuation routes that the state developed, routed people out of the five critical targets in 
Nebraska to rural regions across the state and into the neighboring states of Colorado, 
Kansas, and Iowa.34 Despite its long length, the State of Nebraska Operational Survival 
Plan was, according to Devine, “broad and somewhat vague and rarely took the local 
conditions into account when selecting reception areas.”35 State officials in charge of the 
Survival Plan expected rural residents in the state to ‘establish Mass Care Centers,’ where 
rural Nebraskans were tasked with “providing food, health care, and sanitation” for urban 
evacuees.”36 Devine argues that state officials even left the “logistics of feeding, housing, 
and caring for refugees to town and county officials, offering little assistance to areas 
with sparse populations or few resources.”37  
Like Nebraska, Oregon also created its own plan for evacuating people out of the 
state’s largest urban target, Portland, and assumed that rural Oregonians and the rest of 
the state would be willing and able to provide for evacuated Portlanders in the event of an 
attack. In 1955, the FCDA sponsored a test of Portland’s evacuation plan. Earning the 
name of “Operation Green Light” the mock evacuation plan called for the evacuation of 
six miles in the heart of the city with an expected 200,000 participants. The FCDA 
expected evacuees to leave the city in their vehicles and follow the green lights out of 
town. However, while the FCDA expected 200,000 people to participate in the drill, only 
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90,000-100,000 Portlanders participated in Operation Green Light, and were able to 
evacuate the city in thirty-four to forty minutes. According to the FCDA’s Annual Report 
for 1955, “Approximately 90,000 persons in the metropolitan section moved out of the 
evacuation area of 970 blocks in an estimated 29,423 vehicles – while additional 
thousands walked out of the central district.”38 However, while the response was half of 
what the FCDA expected for Operation Green Light, Oregon’s test of its evacuation plans 
caught the attention of a documentary crew from CBS. In December of 1957, CBS 
showed a thirty-minute film on the city’s evacuation and civil defense plans, including 
the ways that tests like Operation Green Light would serve the city in the event it was 
attacked.  
The CBS film, “The Day Called ‘X’” was narrated by actor Glenn Ford and 
starred “The People of the City of Portland” as well as the city’s mayor, civil defense 
director and other high ranking public officials.39 The Day Called ‘X’ used Operation 
Green Light to show the ways that the city was prepared for evacuation, in the event a 
Hydrogen Bomb did head for the city. A radio announcer, during the film, made sure that 
evacuating drivers “remember there is a traffic plan for the evacuation of the city. All 
cars in the downtown area must follow the green lights, they will lead you out of the 
danger area by the quickest route.”40 While the film promoted civil defense preparedness, 
the depiction of the evacuation of the city and the establishment of the city’s civil defense 
members in a large publicly funded civil defense bunker, like Green Light itself, 
exaggerated the effectiveness of evacuation.  
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Both Operation Green Light and “The Day Called ‘X’” showed a calm evacuation 
out of the city. During Green Light, a calm evacuation was more likely since only a 
fraction of the entire city participated in the test that the local media announced the test’s 
date and time beforehand. However, it is unlikely that the city would evacuate in a way 
similar to the way that Ford described in “The Day Called ‘X’” where he notes that 
“quietly, without panic, the city organizes, become mobile the best it can” after warning 
from an alert siren and CONELRAD—the precursor to the Emergency Broadcast 
System—radio report. Like many of the FCDA and USDA pamphlets, “The Day Called 
‘X’” downplayed the effect of fallout and the blast from an Atomic or Hydrogen Bomb. 
Facing the threat of a Hydrogen Bomb blast, a city weather expert reported to the city’s 
civil defense director, Jack Lowe: “Let’s face facts gentlemen, if we have a blast on 
target, downtown Portland, it will be hours, and probably days before we can get back 
in.” However, if a Hydrogen Bomb did hit downtown Portland, there would be little of 
the city to return to for the evacuated Portlanders.41 
The film also brings attention to a massive, nearly 19,000 square foot 
underground bunker that had been established to ensure that the city government would 
be able to continue functioning in the event of an attack. Located under Kelly Butte on 
the east site of the city, the Portland Disaster and Civil Defense Control Center was 
buried just six miles from downtown and allowed the city government and civil defense 
board a secure operational center without having to leave the metropolitan area. 
However, the nearly 19,000 square foot bunker was not an inexpensive project, costing 
the city and the people of Portland $670,000 dollars. While approval for the shelter came 
after the passage of a 1952 levy, a good portion of the cost of the shelter did not come 
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directly out of the pockets of Portlanders. An article in the Oregonian from 1956 noted 
that, “Portland is getting something of a bargain in the control center. Of the estimated 
$500,000 cost of the structure… half will be provided from federal funds. Of the 
additional $100,000 for radio equipment associated with the control center… 50 per cent 
will come from federal funds and 25 per cent from state funds.”42  
The main focus of “The Day Called ‘X’” was on the ways that Portland’s 
residents would evacuate and the reestablishment of the city government. The film gave 
little attention to the regions where evacuating Portlanders would go. The only mention 
that the film made was that the towns of Forest Grove and Mt. Angel had been 
established as emergency medical centers. The rest of the state was deemed a “support 
area” in the event of an evacuation of Portland.43 While there was little emphasis on rural 
regions during the 1955 test and the CBS film, rural regions were mentioned on other 
tests of the state’s evacuation plans. During the 1958 Operation Alert, an article in the 
Oregonian reported, “mass feeding exercises are planned in Morrow, Polk and Gilliam 
Counties,” rural counties where evacuees would head if the evacuation were real.44 
 The impact that rural regions were to expect was also recorded in an article from 
a regional agriculture newspaper, the Capital Press. The Capital Press informed its rural 
readers after the yearly test of Operation Alert in 1955 that “in event of enemy attack, 
civil defense preparations in small towns and rural areas will be as important as those 
developed by target areas.” The article also included information from the state’s civil 
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defense director, Arthur M. Sheets. Sheets acknowledged that rural Oregonians would 
have the ‘burden’ of caring for evacuating Portlanders. Nevertheless, he offered little 
advice on the ways that rural Oregonians were expected to care for them. Sheets 
remarked: 
A city devastated by atomic attack could not recover through its own power... To 
small cities throughout the state would fall the burden of supplying police 
officers, fire fighting equipment, rescue units, first aid teams, emergency welfare 
teams and other resources. In addition, they would be on the receiving end of a 
large-scale evacuation. . . [Each] city can expect to double its population within 
hours after an attack.” 45 
 
 The Capital Press article showed where evacuating Portlanders were expected to 
go in the event of an attack. Six different reception centers were established in small 
communities outside Portland in Scappoose, Carlton, Brooks, Estacada, Sandy, and Hood 
River. From each reception center, evacuees would be divvied up and placed in various 
counties across the state. The Estacada reception area was expected to receive around 
64,000 people who, according to the Capital Press, “would be divided between 25,000 
for Douglas County and 39,000 for Lane County.” The nearly 96,000 people at the 
reception center in Sandy would mostly be sent to counties in Southern Oregon. The 
article stated, “500 would go to Clackamas County, 5000 in Jefferson County, 20,000 in 
Deschutes County, 8000 in Crook County, 40,000 in Klamath County, and 38,000 in 
Jackson County.”46  
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Rural Civil Defense and Fallout Shelters: 
 
Transition from Evacuation to Fallout Shelters  
 
 The feasibility of evacuation plans such as the one established in Oregon showed 
the ridiculousness of evacuation as a means of civil defense. While leaving high target 
areas was a relatively safe way of protecting a major city, the impact and little resources 
that were supplied to small towns and rural areas that were the end points of evacuation 
routes, would have prevented the plan from having the desired affect. As a result, public 
and private fallout shelters replaced evacuation as the nation’s primary civil defense 
measure by the early 1960s. However, while the federal government, through the FCDA, 
promoted fallout shelters, the FCDA and USDA promoted private shelters to rural 
Americans. At the state level, state branches of the FES administered through land grant 
universities often became the main agency responsible for rural civil defense. In Oregon, 
the Oregon State University Cooperative Extension Service established a Rural Civil 
Defense program in December 1962, months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The program 
continued through the decade, before it was cut as Oregon and the rest of the nation 
started to tire of civil defense by the early 1970s.  
Some of the support for fallout shelters instead of evacuation plans came from a 
more widespread knowledge about the effects of fallout. After military tests in the South 
Pacific during the late 1950s showed that radioactive fallout could travel thousands of 
miles, civil defense became more of a concern in rural areas. By the end of 1960, forty-
eight states had a rural civil defense program in place.47 As more knowledge about 
radioactive fallout became more common and as a result of foreign policy crises, such as 
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the Bay of Pigs incident and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Congress began to support fallout 
shelters as a means of civil defense. By the end of 1961, Congress had set aside $207 
million to “identify, stock, and maintain buildings” as fallout shelters.48 While public 
shelters would provide an effective way for highly populated cities and industrial areas, 
rural Americans were too isolated from one another for public shelters to provide an 
effective means of protection against fallout. In rural areas, federal and state governments 
stressed home fallout shelters as the only way to protect one’s family.49  
 
The FCDA and Family Fallout Shelters 
 
Just like the nation’s policy towards evacuation, fallout shelters directly affected 
rural families just like the rest of the nation. McEnaney argues that civil defense became 
a “paramilitary program, situated between the priorities of the defense establishment and 
the cultural ideals of the postwar home front.”50 The FCDA focused its civil defense 
plans around the family unit during the 1960s for several reasons. One of these reasons 
was that FCDA officials viewed the nuclear family as the home front version of the 
domino theory. They feared that if the family unit failed, that the rest of American society 
would quickly follow.51 Another reason that the FCDA focused on the family unit for 
civil defense was that it took the financial responsibility away from the government and 
placed it on the family. Throughout the 1960s, the FCDA stressed family preparedness 
for an Atomic attack. As more families used their own money to create their own fallout 
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shelter and gathered the necessary supplies to stock their shelter, there was less need for 
the federal government to build and stock public shelters.  
Family preparedness appealed to the FCDA because the family unit would be less 
likely to fall apart if there was an attack.52 It also provided a way for the FCDA to insert 
military style techniques into a civilian population. Civil Defense pamphlets like Home 
Protection Exercises, according to McEnaney, aimed “to transform families into well 
trained paramilitary units that required little or no government assistance.”53 Pamphlets 
like Home Protection Exercises condensed family preparedness into eight “family action 
exercises.” These “exercises” consisted of “warning siren recognition, home shelter 
preparation, home firefighting and prevention, rescue techniques, food and water storage 
and first aid.”54 All of these “action exercises” were still taught in civil defense literature 
over a decade later. The 1968 civil defense booklet, In Time of Emergency devotes a 
chapter to each of these “exercises.”55  
Although it was published fifteen years after Home Protection Exercises, In Time 
of Emergency provided a detailed how-to guide on building a home fallout shelter and 
other preparedness exercises. In Time of Emergency provided information on how a 
family could prepare for a nuclear attack by building and stocking their own fallout 
shelter. The pamphlet recommended that four inches of concrete could be used to 
“provide fallout protection.”56 If a family was unable to afford concrete, other materials 
acted as alternative sources of fallout protection. The booklets stated that “for 
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comparative purposes, 4 inches of concrete” would be equal to: “5 to 6 inches of bricks… 
7 inches of earth… 10 inches of water, 14 inches of books or magazines” and “18 inches 
of wood.” 57  
While the FCDA used military style techniques in preaching family preparedness, 
they also attempted to “domesticate” the Bomb to the civilian population. McEnaney 
states that civil defense officials promoted domestication of the Bomb not to numb 
“people to nuclear war, but detoxified their imaginings of it. Instead of macabre scenarios 
of death, domestication showcased people’s ability to live in a state of constant 
readiness.”58 Civil defense literature broke down the global issue that the nuclear threat 
presented and broke it down into small issues that could be taken care of by the nuclear 
family. The threat of nuclear attack became just another routine household chore. The 
1950 booklet, Survival under Atomic Attack, claimed that “radioactive particles act much 
the same as ordinary, everyday dust” which could be cleaned up with a rag.59  
In an attempt to remove the psychological dangers that were present in a civil 
defense program that promoted preparedness for a nuclear attack, civil defense officials 
McEnaney argues, “cleaned up the language of nuclear warfare.” Nuclear euphemisms 
were often present in civil defense pamphlets. Nuclear fallout became common dust, 
“fallout shelters were ‘family,’ family-type,’ or ‘home’ shelters.”60  
Another reason that domestication was widely used in civil defense was that it 
promoted the “traditional” family values found in the “nuclear” family: the breadwinning 
husband, the housewife, and two to three children. Domestication and family 
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preparedness exercises promoted closer family relationships and units that would be able 
to survive if there was a nuclear attack.61 Like the evacuation drills during the early and 
mid 1950s, volunteers and families tested the effects of an extended period in a fallout 
shelters. One of these tests, done by Princeton University, took the five-member Powner 
family into a shelter on the University’s campus for a two-week stay. During the 
Powner’s fourteen-day stay, the university’s psychology professors monitored the 
unknowing Powner family with a microphone to record their emotional and mental states. 
Before and after the Powner’s shelter stay their emotional and mental states were also 
recorded. After the family emerged from the shelter, each member of the Powner family 
was subjected to even more tests to see if any of the members had suffered any “ill 
effects.”62  
If there were any “ill effects”, the Princeton professors did not report them to the 
government, and when the family spoke to the media after the tests were over, Mr. 
Powner, who spoke for the family, provided a glowing review of his family’s experience. 
The Princeton professors did note that the middle child had, “suffered a bit, as evidenced 
by his moody withdrawal from family activities,” however, he was “quickly brought out 
of this attitude by one administration of a tranquilizer.”63 After the Powners had emerged 
from the shelter, the one topic that Mr. Powner stressed was how the experience had 
created an “integration of the family” where Mr. Powner had a “new-found respect for 
the entire family.”64 Reviews like the ones that Mr. Powner generated for the media after 
their “secret” test was just the type that the FCDA was looking for – reviews that 
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portrayed fallout shelters as a way to promote family relationships, values, and behaviors, 
while at the same time protecting Americans from radioactive fallout.65  
This focus on the family and fallout shelters also extended towards rural families, 
where the whole family was often heavily involved in farm operations. Katherine Jellison 
notes that during the post-war era, farmwomen took a more active role in farm operations 
and helped with field work. According to Jellison “Wives, plus machinery, have taken the 
place of hired men or other outside help.” A report form the Wallaces’ Farmer from 
1960, found that many farmwomen enjoyed working the fields. Roughly fifty percent of 
women who responded to the poll participated in field work. Of those who worked in the 
field, Jellison notes that “40 percent said they liked field work better than housework, 
another 32 percent said that they had no strong preference one way or another, and only 
22 percent reported that they did not like doing field work.” 66  
However, while farmwomen moved into the fields and took a more active role in 
their family’s economic standing, not all rural people were supportive of the move. 
According to Jellison, men and especially male farm hands were often resistant to 
farmwomen spending more time in the fields and less time inside the home as the farm’s 
‘homemaker’. Some farmwomen also supported their role as a homemaker and argued 
that farm work should continue to be a secondary role for rural women. A woman from 
Audubon County, Iowa argued that, “I know it’s a grand feeling to get out and operate a 
tractor that a child can handle. But it seems to me that it isn’t women’s work. A mother 
has her place in the home, taking care of her children… [But a] women should be ready 
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and willing to run errands, get machinery repairs... [and] …chase the hogs in case they 
get out.”67 
 
Fallout Protection for Livestock and Crops 
 
While entire farm families were becoming more involved with the daily 
operations of the farm, civil defense authorities viewed the farm family as an essential 
part of civil defense. However, while non-rural families were encouraged to protect 
themselves, the FCDA and USDA instructed farm families to protect their livestock and 
crops as well as their family. Months after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the USDA 
produced two pamphlets designed to educate farm families about the ways that they 
could protect their livestock and crops from nuclear fallout. The pamphlets entitled, Your 
Livestock Can Survive FALLOUT from NUCLEAR ATTACK and Soil, Crops and 
FALLOUT from NUCLEAR ATTACK looked at ways that farm families could protect 
their livestock and crops from fallout and ensure that the nation’s food supply would 
remain functional during and after an attack.68 The USDA’s pamphlet designed for 
livestock informed rural Americans that their livestock, like themselves, were vulnerable 
to fallout. “For animals, as for humans, shelter is the best protection against fallout… 
Shelter facilities should be kept in readiness, and an adequate supply of feed and water 
should be at hand.” 69 The USDA, like the FCDA also promoted the use of underground 
shelters for livestock. “A good animal shelter is a two-story, basement-type barn with a 
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hay-filled loft.” The pamphlet claimed that the use of hay could “reduce radiation 
exposure as much as 80 percent.” Even a “good, tight, wooden barn” could reduce 
radiation exposure, the pamphlet argued by “about one-half.”70   
Your Livestock can Survive Fallout also made sure that farmers knew how to 
protect their livestock feed and water from radiation. Like many of the FCDA pamphlets 
that downplayed the effects of fallout, the Your Livestock can Survive Fallout also 
compared fallout to dust. The USDA recommended that farmers cover exposed haystack 
with a tarp. This way, “the fallout will lodge on the tarpaulin and can be removed with it. 
The hay could be used immediately.”71 Extra water supplies could also be protected from 
fallout if “covered with any material that will keep out dust.”72  
Civil Defense officials placed extra emphasis on ensuring that dairy cows and 
poultry were protected in the event of an attack. According to Your Livestock can Survive 
Fallout, “milking cows should be kept confined and be given uncontaminated feed and 
water to prevent contaminating milk until local authorities tell you it is safe to release 
them.”73 Likewise, Your Livestock can Survive Fallout also recommended that if farmers 
did not have enough feed and water protected from fallout that the limited amount of feed 
should be reserved for the milking cows. This way, the milk could be used by the 
farmer’s family for both its caloric and liquid value. As for the leftover livestock the 
USDA advised, “It would be much better to keep the other animals alive on contaminated 
feed and water than to let them die from starvation.”74  
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The USDA also viewed poultry as an important source of protein after an attack. 
The pamphlet claimed, “Poultry are more resistant to radiation exposure than are other 
species of livestock.” Poultry also benefited since they were often kept under some sort 
of cover and their feed was processed and kept under cover as well. 75 If farmers were 
unable to move their livestock under cover during an attack, the USDA recommended 
that they wash them “as soon as it is safe for you to stay outside for a limited time.” The 
USDA advised farmers to wear “protective clothing” during washing, even though the 
“removal of radioactive fallout from the hides of animals is difficult, and attempts may be 
ineffective in some cases.”76  
In a separate pamphlet, Soil Crops, and Fallout from Nuclear Attack, the USDA 
again offered advice for farmers on the ways that they could reduce radiation exposure 
and recommended other types of crops that would be less affected by radiation. Even 
though the USDA published both pamphlets months apart, the Department’s advice to 
farmers in Soil, Crops, and Fallout advised farmers in a more scientific tone than in Your 
Livestock can Survive Fallout. Both pamphlets included a section on what radiation was, 
and the ways that farmers could protect their livestock and crops from radiation. Soil, 
Crops, and Fallout, however, goes into more depth about radiation and the different types 
of radiation. While in the Your Livestock Can Survive, the USDA is more concerned on 
making sure that farmers kept their livestock sheltered the best they could, in Soil, Crops, 
and Fallout, the USDA is especially concerned with the effect that a particular 
radioactive isotope, strontium 90, would have on soil and crops. According to the USDA, 
strontium 90 was especially dangerous because “strontium could contaminate soils and 
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plants for decades.” Since it was “ chemically similar to calcium,” it would contaminate 
“plants, particularly those growing in calcium- deficient soils.” 77  
If areas were highly contaminated with strontium, the USDA advised that the land 
might have to be taken “out of production for an indefinite period until the radioactivity 
decayed to a safe level.” However, if the land was not highly contaminated, the USDA 
advised farmers to treat the land with lime and fertilizer as well as to remove the 
contaminated vegetation or mulch. The pamphlet strongly recommended that if farmers 
had contaminated soil in regions where fields normally required lime or fertilizer for 
increased production, that the same application of lime or fertilizer could reduce 
strontium radiation “taken up by the plants… by as much as two-thirds.” 78  
Like many of the other civil defense pamphlets of the 1950s and 1960s, Soil, 
Crops, and Fallout continued to downplay the effects of radioactive fallout. Under a 
section entitled, “Decontaminating Harvested Crops,” the pamphlet suggested that if any 
crops had been covered with fallout participles “the radioactive participles can be 
removed in the same way as any other dust- by washing, vacuum cleaning, or brushing.” 
The pamphlet also recommended that for many contaminated food crops, that they would 
be “safe to use after washing” and depending on the food, “peeled.” 79 The idea that 
irradiated produce would be safe to eat after being washed and peeled is also found in a 
series of rural civil defense Public Service Announcements television ads produced by 
the U.S. Civil Defense Office from 1965, that claimed contaminated fruit, like an apple 
“would be perfectly safe to eat, if you just peel it”. However, the PSA warned viewers 
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that, “in disposing of the peelings, remember that they may still contain radioactive 
material.” The spot continued by reiterating the information found in Soil Crops, and 
Fallout, that fruits and vegetables would be safe to eat if they were properly washed and 
peeled.80  
 
Gendered Division of Rural Civil Defense Tasks 
 
Many of the various tasks that the FCDA and USDA promoted to rural families 
on the ways that they could protect their family and livestock fell along gender lines. Like 
non-rural families, men were considered the head of the farm family. Tasks designed to 
protect the family and farm were generally understood to be men’s tasks. Illustrations that 
accompanied Your Livestock can Survive Fallout and Soil, Crops and Fallout showed 
male farmers carrying out any task that required manual labor such as harvesting crops in 
contaminated soil (Figures 1 and 2).81  
For tasks that were more domestic in nature, such as stocking the family shelter 
with food, first aid, and other materials, or cooking with possibly contaminated foods, 
rural women were expected to be in control of these tasks as the farm’s homemaker. The 
information in Soil, Crops and Fallout, on how to remove fallout off contaminated 
produce and how to safely eat the produce as well as similar information from the 
television PSA were directed toward women. The cover of a USDA pamphlet, Family 
Food Stockpile for Survival showed a middle class woman happily stocking her family’s 
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food pantry (Figure 3).82 The USDA pamphlet informed its mostly female readers: 
“Every family should either build up and keep a 2-week supply of regular food in the 
home at all times or assemble and maintain a special 2-week stockpile of survival foods 
in the fallout shelter or home.” Inside the pamphlet, sample menus showed what foods 
would help extend the family’s food supply while providing variety to what the family 
ate during a two-week stay in a shelter.83  
Home and emergency preparedness activities were also generally directed toward 
women. An update in the Capital Press from the Lane County Extension Agent reported: 
“Medical self help—the Civil Defense program that prepares a person to cope with 
emergency—is sweeping Lane County’s rural communities.” In Junction City, a small 
town north of Eugene, “Vard Nelson, Junction City Civil Defense director, is working 
with Mrs. Clark Hill; Mrs. Lester Wheeler, safety chairmen of the Junction City home 
extension unit; Mrs. Lois Stroda. Business and Professional Women representative; and 
Dr. Lee Harris in organizing classes.”84 All of the people listed in the article, except for 
the civil defense director and doctor leading the class, were women who would pass 
along what they taught in the class to other women. Two of the women, Mrs. Lester 
Wheeler and Mrs. Lois Stroda, had connections with other organizations or clubs where 
the medical training would be passed on to other rural women in the community.   
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 Figure 1: Heading from Rural Family Defense
products that American farms produced.
Figure 2: Illustration from Soil, Crops and Fallout
Figure 3: Cover from the USDA pamphlet, 
stocking a food pantry. Women generally handled tasks like ensuring that the family had a two
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Regional Promotion of Rural Family and Livestock Fallout Shelters 
 
Besides constructing or improvising a fallout shelter for their families, rural 
Americans were encouraged to provide fallout protection for their livestock and crops. A 
pamphlet published by the Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service in 1966 called 
Protecting Family and Livestock From Nuclear Fallout, showed farmers how they could 
build or modify structures to provide their livestock with fallout protection. The pamphlet 
provided charts that showed the amount of feed, water, and space would be needed for 
different animals over a two-week period. It also instructed farmers to consider whether 
they needed to consider “mechanical necessities, such as ventilation systems, emergency 
power generations, water pumps and maintenance.”85 The Iowa State Cooperative 
Extension Service booklet advised that farmers modify their barns and outbuildings, with 
“reinforcing structures with more costly and labor-intensive material such as cement, 
sand and earth.”86 
 The Oregon State Cooperative Extension Service, administered through Oregon 
State University, established a rural civil defense program on December 1, 1962, weeks 
after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis that increased the nation’s interest in 
civil defense.87 Over the decade, the rural civil defense program sponsored by the OSU 
Extension Service expanded across the Pacific Northwest. This regional rural civil 
defense program was terminated by the Defense Department after budget cuts in 1968 
and as the nation’s view towards civil defense started to diminish. By the late 1960s and 
                                                        
85
 Devine, 428 
86
 Devine, 428.  
87
 Extension Service Records, Special Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University 
Libraries, Box 73 “Rural Civil Defense 1962-1964.”  
 36
early 1970s, Americans, as well as state and federal governments, started to lose faith in 
civil defense measures as a secure means of protection if the Soviets decided to attack. 
While the regional rural civil defense program was cut, the FES offered Oregon the 
opportunity to “continue the same Regional Coordinating responsibility for another 
program to be funded entirely” by the FES, in recognition of the leadership that the rural 
civil defense program in Oregon had on the Pacific Northwest. This allowed aspects of 
the rural civil defense program in Oregon to continue into the early 1970s. By 1971, the 
rural civil defense program in Oregon and the FES started to turn its focus away from just 
civil defense. Instead, the focus moved towards natural disasters and environmental 
concerns such as pollution.88  
 Even before the OSU Extension Service established the Rural Civil Defense 
program, the OSU Extension Service worked to ensure that farmers were aware of the 
need for civil defense in their rural region. In January 1961, J.W. Scheel, the Assistant 
Director of the Cooperative Extension Service at OSU, argued: “the Rural Civil Defense 
program has two main objectives… One, to inform rural families (both farm and non-
farm) about the threat of radio active fallout and the defense against it.” While Scheel’s 
first point was educational in nature, his second point prompted male farmers to take 
direct responsibility for their family and livestock’s protection. Scheel argued that his 
second objective was to “induce them [farmers] to prepare family fallout shelters and 
take measures to protect their livestock.”89 
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 Despite only lasting six years, the rural civil defense program in Oregon and the 
FES attempted to promote the need for private shelters for rural Oregonians as well as 
shelters for their livestock. Unlike many other parts of the country, most houses in 
Oregon and the Northwest did not have a basement or form of cellar that were more 
common in the Midwest and rest of the nation. Without this basic form of shelter, rural 
Northwesters were advised to create their own fallout shelter and shield their livestock 
from fallout.  
James J. McAlister, the rural defense specialist at OSU authored a three-page 
pamphlet entitled “Rural Defense” in which he explained the need for civil defense in 
rural areas. McAlister recognized that rural Oregonians might be reluctant to pursue 
expensive preparedness measures for their families and livestock when they lived in an 
isolated region. According to McAlister, “Planning for a disaster before it occurs seems 
to have very little popular appeal.” With little popular support, it was easy for emergency 
preparations to be “ rationalized completely out of programs and activities.” McAlister 
attempted to change the minds of farm families and county extension agents who read his 
pamphlet. His first argument for the necessity of rural civil defense was that it prepared 
rural Oregonians for the worst-case scenario, and if a more likely disaster occurred-- such 
as floods and other natural disasters-- farmers would be better prepared. McAlister 
argued, “If people are prepared to survive this type of disaster” (a nuclear attack) “ they 
can then survive any lesser disaster.”90 McAlister’s second argument for reluctant farmers 
was that protecting their family and livestock could be done inexpensively and 
effectively.  
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Logically it can be predicted that…farming areas would most likely not be a 
deliberate target. However, the peculiar characteristics of nuclear warfare makes 
the farmer as vulnerable as his city neighbor to the major nuclear menace known 
as fallout. In the face of such an overwhelming threat what can a farmer do? 
Fortunately, there are simple, inexpensive and effective counter measures which 
can be employed to reduce the hazard of radioactive fallout on the farm. These 
measures involve basically the shielding of people and livestock from harmful 
radiations.91 
 
 These “simple, inexpensive and effective counter measures” that McAlister 
recommended for farmers to protect their livestock included, “hay, grain, earth, cement, 
and rocks.” McAlister claimed that these would “provide low-cost effective shielding in 
existing farm shelters.”92 McAlister’s insistence to make sure that farmers and county 
agents knew that fallout protection could be done inexpensively and effectively shows 
that farmers were not directly hesitant towards civil defense, but were instead hesitant in 
allocating funds on improvement that they believed would most likely not be necessary.  
McAlister’s views on the effectiveness of rural civil defense in Oregon reveal 
some frustrations toward the FES and state government’s views on civil defense. 
According to McAlister, “Rural defense in the current Oregon situation has very little 
opportunity for success as a campaign program…Since Extension’s obligation to the 
people and the U.S. Department of Agriculture has not changed, the educational program 
must be adapted to overcome the barriers that exist.”93   
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Local Promotion of Rural Family and Livestock Fallout Shelters in the Midwest 
 
States created and administered their own civil defense plans and offered varying 
levels of support for their rural inhabitants. However, these plans were useless unless 
farmers and county officials supported them. While farmers did not have much choice in 
their role with evacuation plans, they did have more control in their level of response 
toward fallout shelters.  
Wabaunsee County is a rural county in Northeast Kansas situated between 
Topeka, Junction City, and Manhattan, Kansas. The county provides an example of a 
rural county promoting home shelters over public fallout shelters. Located about forty 
miles west from the state capital of Topeka, Wabaunsee County provided only five public 
shelters for the county’s roughly 6500 residents. Four of the five shelters were in the 
county seat of Alma (Wabaunsee County Courthouse, City Hall, Rural High School, and 
Rural High School Gym), and the final shelter was in Harveyville (Rural High School), 
over thirty miles away from the other public shelters.94 The Wabaunsee County 
Commissioners noted in 1970 that there were only 744 public shelter spaces. In addition 
to the public shelter spaces, the county commissioners noted that there were “available 
home shelter spaces for approximately 3,966 persons” which left “a shortage of 
approximately 1,938 shelter spaces for Wabaunsee County.”95 They also noted that the 
public shelter spaces were located in Alma and Harveyville and that “rural areas are 
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urged to improvise home shelter. Everyone with a basement should use it as their shelter 
and are encouraged to invite their neighbors to share it.”96  
Like much of the Midwest, many residents in Wabaunsee County had some sort 
of an underground cellar that could easily be altered to work as a fallout shelter. An 
article in a 1962 edition of Nebraska Farmer showed that these cellars could be used as a 
fallout shelter with few changes. "Most farms already have shelters in the form of storm 
caves and potato cellars. It's just another step to prepare them for protection against 
radioactive fallout. Many of these are already being cleaned up and stocked with food 
according to civil defense recommendations. Little effort and expense are required to 
make almost any home offer some degree of fallout protection."97 
With a majority of their constituents living in a rural area and small towns, the 
Wabaunsee County Commissioners also discussed protecting livestock from any fallout 
radiation. However, they did not mention or recommend that buildings be reinforced. 
Instead, they followed advice similar to the recommendations from McAlister: 
You should place as many of your livestock and as much feed as possible in barns 
or other covered buildings. A full hayloft affords some shielding from fallout 
radiation for animals housed below. Any hay, feed or grain you cannot get into 
barns should be covered… Exposure to radiation harms only living creatures. 
Therefore if food, water, ect., is covered in such a way that it cannot be 
contaminated by fallout dust or particles it will be safe for consumption.98 
 
 The Wabaunsee County Commissioners also provided the residents of the county 
information on how to properly slaughter any livestock after a nuclear attack. They 
stated: “Animals which have grazed on contaminated pastures should be slaughtered and 
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muscle meat would be fit for human consumption. However, internal organs… should not 
be eaten.” They also noted: “If the radiation level in your area indicates that animal 
sickness may be widespread, you probably will be given instructions on slaughtering. 
Care must be taken in slaughtering to prevent contamination of the carcass by fallout 
particles.”99 Citing the information found in Your Livestock Can Survive Fallout nearly 
verbatim, the County Commissioners advised that Wabaunsee residents raise chickens. 
Since the birds would be “a particular important direct food resource because they are 
relatively resistant to radiation, especially if they are raised under cover, using safe 
packaged feeds.”100 Finally, the County Commissioners advised that, “Milk from cows 
that have grazed on contaminated pastures would be harmful, especially to children. 
Therefore, alternate milk sources (such as canned or powdered milk, or milk from fallout-
free areas) should be used for the first few weeks following fallout.”101  
However, while Wabaunsee County made recommendations to its rural citizens 
on some inexpensive preparations they could do to protect themselves and their families, 
a dairy in Nebraska went further. The Roberts Dairy Company outside of Omaha 
constructed an underground fallout shelter that was designed to hold over 200 Guernsey 
cows, two bulls, and up to fifteen farm hands. The shelter’s existence soon garnered 
international attention. In October 1969, The Tuscaloosa News republished a story that 
originally appeared in The London Sunday Times on the shelter. The article’s author, 
Philip Clarke, argued, “In Omaha, home of America’s Strategic Air Command, they take 
both world defense and the milk supply very seriously.”102 Picking up on the USDA and 
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 FCDA’s theme of maintaining the nation’s food supply in the event of an attack the 
dairy’s general safety supervisor, Ed Anderson remarked, “What’s the use of having a lot 
of live people left after a nuclear attack if we can’t feed them?”
the time to show readers in both the United Kingdom and the United States, that the 
Roberts Dairy was a strong proponent of the Cold War. On the shelter’s large 14
door a sign read, “War. Sacrifice for the USA, Suicide for the USSR, nonsense for 
everybody.” (Figure 4)104 Even the shelter’s manure drainage system provided the 
Roberts Dairy the opportunity to send the Soviet Union a not so subtle message as the 
drainage system sloped from West to East.
 
Figure 4
 
Local Promotion of Rural Family and Livestock Fallout Shelters in the Northwest
The Robert’s Dairy slight jab at the USSR was not the only attempt at rural civil 
defense that looked at the ways that animal waste could be used to protect farms in a 
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metaphorical or literal way. One of the projects that the OSU Rural Civil Defense 
program sponsored looked at the feasibility of using common agricultural products, 
including liquid manure, to wash fallout particles off the roofs of dairy barns by using a 
pump and sprinkler system. The “Engineering Report to Determine the Feasibility of 
Using Agricultural Commodities and Decontamination Procedures to Upgrade Dairy 
Structures” project, sponsored by the OSU Extension Service Agricultural Engineer, 
Walter Matson attempted to “determine if dairy structures in Western Oregon, 
Washington and California could be converted into suitable fallout shelters in the event 
of nuclear fallout.” These dairy facilities on the western halves of Washington, Oregon 
and California produced “approximately 80%” of the region’s “dairy products…about 8 
billion pounds of milks for 18 billion people.” 106  
Matson saw one principle problem with the design of dairy barns and their use as 
suitable shelter for livestock in the event of an attack. Matson reported: “The primary 
problem in providing fallout shelter protection under a diary structure as investigated in 
this report is the reduction of the overhead contribution of gamma radiation. A solution 
for this problem is to use a decontamination agent on the roof. The two liquids available 
on dairy farms are water and liquid manure.”107 However, Matson acknowledged that this 
study was a first look at using either water or liquid manure to reduce gamma radiation 
on dairy barn roofs. Matson argued: “The use of liquid manure as a decontaminations 
agent requires research data prior to make recommendations for its use.”108 
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While basements or cellar shelters were not often possible in the Western half of 
Oregon, where wet winters would have been more like to flood or damaged any 
underground structure, cellar shelters were a plausible option in the drier Eastern half of 
the state. Matson reported in a biannual report to the USDA in 1967 that he and others 
involved in rural civil defense had been active throughout 1967 finding fallout shelters 
across the state. In Malheur County in Southeastern Oregon, a county agent had found 
that potato cellars could be used as shelters. According to Matson, the county agent had 
“observed various structures that might provide fallout shelter. If a structure seemed 
feasible, he reported his findings to the County CD Director... In the last year, Malheur 
County has increased its number of public fallout shelters in rural areas by 1,056 
spaces."109 
Radiation Education for Rural Northwest Families 
 
Another aspect of the OSU Extension Service Rural Civil Defense program was 
promoting the education of rural Oregonians about the dangers of fallout. While the OSU 
extension service worked to educate farmers about the effects of nuclear technology on 
their livestock and crops as well how to prepare against it, Oregon 4-H attempted to 
educate the next generation of Oregon farmers. 4-Hers participated in “The 4-H TV 
Action Series” which included, “ ten, thirty-minute television programs on the subject of 
emergency preparedness."110 As an attempt to teach 4-H’ers about radiation, Rural Civil 
Defense Specialist, Ellwood D. Miller conducted an “Atomic Easter Egg Hunt” at several 
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county 4-H summer camps. The 1967 report noted that over 500 children aged nine to 
fourteen had the opportunity to receive “information about radioactivity and resulting 
radiation hazards.” After receiving a lecture from Miller the children went on their 
“Atomic Easter Egg Hunt.” The report explained that: 
The campers were divided into teams of two or threes and each team was given a 
geiger counter... The team disassembled the instrument, installed batteries, and 
performed an operational check. Prior to the beginning of the instructional period, 
the RCD Specialist distributed four sources of uranium within the confines of 
well-marked boundaries. These radioactive sources were the atomic easter eggs. It 
was the object of the team with their instrument to discover the easter egg using 
the radiation given off of the sources of uranium. The rate of radiation being 
given off by the source was comparable to the rate from the dial of an illuminate 
wristwatch.111 
 
 The Rural Civil Defense program also worked to educate local farmers about the 
basics of fallout and radiation. In 1965, the Rural Civil Defense program requested funds 
from the FES to pursue a project that would use “self-teaching devices” to educate rural 
Oregonians about the “basics of nuclear physics.” The project argued that, “The use of 
self-teaching devices can cause increased understanding of basic [nuclear] concepts, 
arouse interest in the subject matter, and provide a common knowledge level for 
conference and workshop participants.” Additionally,  “This teaching device could be 
utilized through all levels of the Extension program. … Many rural people who work 
with Extension agents prefer to work independently rather than attend meetings. This 
method of instruction would aid them in securing the basic information needed to 
understand other Rural Civil Defense publications.”112 The OSU Extension Service 
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hoped that by educating local farmers and their families they would be able to increase 
the amount of awareness that these people had toward civil defense. 
 While the Extension Service Records do not show if the ‘self teaching’ program 
ever received funds from the FES, education about the dangers of fallout and the need for 
protection from it did makes its way to County agents who passed their knowledge along 
to local farmers. One success story that the Rural Civil Defense program made sure to 
include in their report to the USDA from the first half of 1966 highlighted a recent event 
between the Clackamas County Extension Agent and a group of three farmers. The report 
excitedly noted that the example showed, the  “tremendous interest that farmers can have 
in emergency preparedness if they understand just enough about it to be able to discuss 
i[t] intelligently.”113 The report explained that: 
Clayton Wills, Clackamas county extension agent, invited three farmers to a 
USDA Defense Board meeting. His purpose was to acquaint them with 
emergency preparedness and ask them for advice on how to incorporate this into 
the on-going extension program in Clackamas country. The film "Radiation 
Effects on Farm Animals" was shown to the group and a brief discussion was 
presented on shelter for livestock and poultry. The three farmers asked questions 
and discussed emergency preparedness for two and one-half hours. They were 
thoroughly interested and wanted to develop plans on their own farms 
immediately. No scare tactics were used, but facts were presented and the farmers 
responded to these facts.114 
 
   
The example from Clackamas County showed that farmers could be encouraged 
through educational tactics to increase their level of emergency preparedness by enacting, 
or promising to enact, rural civil defense measures on their property. However, most of 
the measures that were enacted across the state followed the recommendations from 
McAlister—simple and inexpensive measures. The effectiveness of these measures, 
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luckily, was never put to the test, so the amount of protection that shielding livestock and 
rural families with common agricultural and natural materials from radioactive fallout 
was not tested.   
 
Conclusion  
 
 Throughout the Cold War, the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack created a justified 
fear. This fear caused the spread of civil defense information across the country that 
worked its way down from the federal government, to state civil defense agencies, and 
finally made its way to individual rural Americans. However, while the majority of 
Americans did live in urban regions of the nation, the federal government expected rural 
Americans to bear the burden of caring for urban evacuees as well as providing 
protection for their own families and their livelihood, crops and livestock. This placed a 
logistical, moral, and financial burden on to the nation’s farmers and other rural 
Americans. 
Throughout the 1950s when evacuation plans constituted the majority of the 
nation’s civil defense plan, the federal government expected rural families to be willing 
and able to provide for urban evacuees. However, the federal government often ignored 
the idea that rural Americans would not have all of the space, food, water or other 
materials to provide for a large temporary group of people. Evacuation plans also often to 
take into consideration the different political and cultural views of rural and urban 
Americans. Fears over what could happen if large urban centers that including a wide 
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variety of minorities were placed in mostly white and conservative rural regions were 
mostly ignored by the FCDA and other civil defense agencies.   
At the regional level evacuation plans, again focused on the needs of the 
evacuating urban populations and not of the needs that the rural populations would need 
to care for the evacuees. Extensive evacuation plans developed in Nebraska and Oregon, 
created detailed plans on the evacuation of each state’s main targets. However, in each 
state, the evacuation plan provided little information to rural residents on how they were 
expected to provide goods and services to the evacuees. In Oregon, the only information 
that was directed towards rural Oregonians came from the Capital Press, in one article 
that detailed where evacuating Portlanders would be transported to in the aftermath of an 
attack if one occurred. While the state’s civil defense director acknowledged that rural 
Oregonians and small towns in the state would be essential if Portland were attacked, 
Sheets gave little information to the Capital Press’s readers how they were to provide 
basic services or how they were suppose to pay for the services.  
By the early 1960s, fallout shelters replaced evacuation as the nation’s primary 
civil defense measure. As evacuation plans, like the ones established in Nebraska and 
Oregon, showed the ridiculousness of moving an entire urban population out of a city and 
into rural regions that were still threatened by fallout, civil defense measures moved to 
fallout shelters. All across the nation, the FCDA urged family fallout shelters as a way to 
ensure that the nation would not fall apart as families and communities banded together 
in fallout shelters. The militaristic like tasks that the FCDA focused on militarized the 
American family, according to McEnaney. The regimental nature of civil defense tasks 
also extended towards rural families as they incorporated the general policies towards 
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American families and policies that focused on especially rural concerns of providing 
shelter for livestock. Like the rest of the country, rural civil defense tasks were divided 
between men and women. As the head of the farm family, male farmers took on civil 
defense measures that worked to ensure the protection of their family, land, and livestock 
from fallout. Rural and non-rural women alike took on similar tasks in regards to civil 
defense. Rural women did domestic tasks such as ensuring that the farm family had a 
two-week supply of food in the family shelter and knowing how to prepare potentially 
irradiated produce. Home and emergency preparedness tasks, such as first aid, were also 
in the domain of rural women’s civil defense tasks.  
Regional attempts to provide education about fallout and promoting rural 
Midwesterners and Northwesterners to provide shelter for their families and livestock 
often fell to State Extension Services. In the Midwest, states like Nebraska and Iowa 
encouraged their rural residents to alter their storm cellars into fallout shelters. In Iowa 
the Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service, produced a pamphlet geared towards 
showing rural Iowans how they could build fallout shelters for their livestock. In Oregon, 
the OSU Extension Service sponsored a Rural Civil Defense program that attempted to 
educate rural Oregonians and Northwesterners about the fallout threat that they faced. 
The Rural Civil Defense program also worked to find inexpensive and effective ways to 
shelter rural families and their livestock from fallout.  
Local attempts from the OSU Rural Civil Defense program provided education 
about fallout, radiation and ways to protect families and livestock from fallout. The Rural 
Civil Defense program attempted to create ‘self-teaching devices’ to educate farmers 
about the danger that fallout posed to them. When local Extension Agents were able to 
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educate farmers about fallout, they reported success in generating positive views towards 
civil defense amongst rural Oregonians. Education about fallout also extended towards 
the next generation of Oregon farmers by targeting 4-H’ers at summer camp activities 
like the “Atomic Easter Egg Hunt.”  
Despite regional differences, including population and military or nuclear sites, 
the rural Americans who lived in the Midwest and Northwest during the Cold War often 
approached rural civil defense measures in similar ways. In both Nebraska and Oregon, 
evacuation plans focused on the concerns of urban populations and mostly ignored the 
concerns of rural Nebraskans and Oregonians. While the FCDA and USDA promoted 
rural Americans to take proactive measures to ensure the nation's food supply, most rural 
Americans did not have the funds to build extensive fallout shelters for their family or 
livestock. Most rural Americans in the Midwest and Northwest looked for inexpensive 
and creative ways to provide shielding for their family and livestock. Some of these 
measures included altering a previously established storm cellar into a fallout shelter. 
Other measures included looking at the possibility of using water or liquid manure to 
decontaminate the roofs of diary barns. However, while most rural Americans in the 
Midwest and Northwest looked for inexpensive ways to provide some protection for their 
family or livestock, the Roberts Dairy Farm created an underground fallout shelter that 
was large enough to hold 200 cattle and fifteen farm hands for a two-week period. 
Despite facing federal civil defense policies that requested that rural Americans take a 
high responsibility in ensuring their own protection and the protection of the livestock 
and crops, many rural Americans in the Midwest and Northwest found creative ways to 
ensure that they protected their families and the nation’s food supply.  
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